ABSTRACT Double-apping happens when passengers or drivers use multiple smartphone-based e-hailing applications. While it has been observed in practice, its effects on the e-hailing service have not yet been explored by any previous study. In this paper, we give the first systematic study of the phenomenon of double-apping and clarify its definition in a smartphone-based e-hailing market model with two ridesharing companies. We also define four cruising modes for drivers, i.e., stationary, random, gravity, and historical. To study the effects of the double-apping and compare different cruising modes, we conduct extensive simulations based on real taxi GPS trajectories. Our results demonstrate that: 1) the network effect exists in the e-hailing market, which makes the driver ratio of the market leader at equilibrium grows faster with higher market share; 2) the gravity and historical cruising modes outperform the other two modes, in terms of assigned ratio, dispatch distance, order number, and driver's profit; 3) passenger's and driver's double-apping have the opposite effects for a ridesharing company; and 4) the ridesharing companies are in a Prisoner's Dilemma, where two-sided double-apping cannot be achieved and a unilateral action of allowing driver's double-apping brings no benefit to the ridesharing company itself.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of mobile applications and the uprise of ridesharing companies, e.g., Uber [1] and Lyft [2] , we have more choices of smartphone-based mobility options nowadays. Drivers with private cars have the opportunity of providing smartphone-based e-hailing service during their free time. Since the drivers are not officially employed, they can work for multiple ridesharing companies without violating any regulation, which is known as the phenomenon of doubleapping. Similar phenomenon also exists from the viewpoint of passengers, when passengers try to get a ride by switching between different applications.
While this phenomenon has been observed for a long time in practice, its impact on the smartphone-based e-hailing market is rarely discussed. Intuitively, both passengers and drivers have incentives for double-apping. Passengers would try multiple applications to get a higher probability of getting a ride, especially when the e-hailing services provided by multiple companies are homogeneous, with no significant difference. There is no reason for them to give up if no car is available from one application, when there are other choices. Drivers would use multiple applications to get more orders and a higher revenue, as they have the chance of serving more passengers from multiple applications, instead of the passengers who use only one application.
However, the ridesharing company may be unhappy if its drivers work for another company simultaneously, as there is a risk that the e-hailing service may be damaged for its loyal passengers. For example, Uber is concerned about its drivers who work simultaneously for Lyft and even developed a 'Hell' program to track and figure out which drivers practice double-apping and executed a plan meant to entice doubleappers to drive exclusively for them [3] .
The influence of double-apping may not as simple as it seems, as it involves the competition between multiple ridesharing companies and the user choices of both drivers and passengers. In this work, we give the first systematic study of double-apping and answer the following questions:
• Why would passengers practice double-apping?
• Why would drivers be willing to drive for multiple ridesharing companies?
• Would it always be a bad thing for a company if its drivers work for another ridesharing company simultaneously? In this work, we mainly consider the ridesharing market with two companies. This market structure with two major companies is common all over the world, but the market shares of these two companies may vary from place to place. For example, the ridesharing markets in China and US are totally different:
• Monopoly: in China, Didi Chuxing [4] claimed it had more than 87% of the private car-hailing market share in October, 2016 [5] . However, there are still several small companies struggling in China's e-hailing market, including Yidao [6] , CAR Inc [7] , etc.
• Duopoly: in US, Uber and Lyft are still fighting with each other in several cities, and Lyft's market share climbed to about a third of the market recently after Uber's reputation was in tatters following a string of scandals [8] . To fully describe different market situations, we would assign different market shares to both companies and find the market equilibria. We would also use an agent-based simulation method to model the driver's mobility behavior by comparing four different cruising modes, i.e., stationary, random, gravity, and historical. We evaluate the effects of double-apping with four different metrics, i.e., assigned ratio, dispatch distance, order number, and driver's profit. We would give detailed definitions of these cruising modes and evaluation metrics in the corresponding sections.
We also consider the effects of double-apping added on the baseline situation of market equilibrium, and define both passenger's double-apping and driver's double-apping. Since we are dealing with a ride-hailing market with two companies, there is two types of double-apping from the view of the companies, i.e., one-sided double-apping, when only the users from one company are involved, and two-sided doubleapping, when the users from both companies are involved. Thus we would consider four situations, i.e., passenger's onesided double-apping, passenger's two-sided double-apping, driver's one-sided double-apping, and driver's two-sided double-apping.
To sum up, our key findings in this work are as follows:
• The driver ratio at equilibrium grows faster with higher market share, when the company has more than half of the market share and becomes the market leader, which can be explained by the network effect [9] ;
• Two sophisticated cruising modes, gravity and historical, outperform the other two modes in most cases;
• We validate the motivations of both passenger's and driver's double-appings and find that there is an opposite relationship between them;
• We find that the ridesharing companies are in a situation of Prisoner's Dilemma [10] , where two-sided doubleapping cannot be guaranteed and one-sided doubleapping brings no benefit unilaterally. Our main contributions in this work are as follows: 1) We are the first to systematically study the effects of double-apping, and give definitions for double-apping from both passenger's and driver's perspectives; 2) We introduce a simplified ride-hailing market model with two ridesharing companies, describe our simulation process and evaluation metrics, and present our key findings in this paper, based on the simulations using real taxi trajectories; 3) We link the study of double-apping for the e-hailing service with other disciplines including economics and game theory, and use their tools, i.e., the network effect and Prisoner's Dilemma, to explain the behaviors and effects of double-apping. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a literature review of related work. Section III describes our models and key assumptions. Section IV presents our simulation details. Section V delivers our results and findings. We conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK A. ON-DEMAND RIDE-HAILING SERVICE
Since the inception of the ridesharing companies which provide on-demand ride-hailing service, i.e., Uber and Lyft, they have gained a lot of interest in the research community. They provide a new choice of transportation, and there are evidences showing that they have a higher efficiency than traditional taxis and make it easier to get a ride [11] - [13] . Other topics include dynamic pricing [14] , ride-pooling [15] , [16] , optimal vehicle rebalancing policies [17] , [18] , and empty car routing [19] .
Cruising behaviors of drivers are also being studied before. In most cases, the drivers refer to taxi drivers specifically. Similar cruising modes have been proposed before, e.g., actively hunting or passively waiting for passengers [20] . Clustering algorithms have been used to identify pickup/dropoff hotspots [21] , which provide useful information for cruising.
Since there are multiple ridesharing companies, there is inevitably competition between these companies. This kind of competition between platforms has been discussed before [22] - [24] . The price of fragmentation, which captures how much demand splitting between platforms degrades the efficiency, is also explored [25] . While there are many other factors that would affect the performance of a company's ridehailing service, e.g., promotion, reward, or even company's reputation, they are of less relevance to our work since our concern is about the passenger's and driver's double-apping behaviors.
B. DOUBLE-APPING ON OTHER PLATFORMS
Other than the smartphone-based e-hailing service, similar practices to double-apping can be found in other platforms. VOLUME 6, 2018 One example is the crowdsourcing platform, e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk [26] , on which the workers might be freelancers with flexible time and location [27] . Our results would be inspiring for these platforms.
In other cases, the platforms may exchange resources between each other actively, based on a contract or cooperation. As we would show later in this paper, two-sided double-apping is mutually beneficial. For example, in airline industry, codeshare agreement has existed for a long time, which means that an aircraft would carry the passengers from two airlines [28] . Another example is the express delivery industry, where collaboration dispatching has been used to form an alliance among multiple carriers by sharing their transportation requests and vehicle capacities in order to increase vehicle utilization rates and reduce empty back hauls [29] .
III. MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we would introduce our models and key assumptions about the e-hailing market model.
A. MARKET ASSUMPTIONS
In this work, we assume that there are two companies operating in a e-hailing market. For clarity, we denote these two companies as Company A and Company B. Before considering double-apping phenomenon, to model different market situations as we mentioned in Section I, we define market share as the proportion of ride requests. Specifically, we denote the market shares of two companies as α A and α B , where 0 < α A < 1, 0 < α B < 1, and α A +α B = 1. If the total number of ride requests is M , then α A · M ride requests are sent by passengers who use the e-hailing service provided by Company A, and α B · M ride requests are sent by passengers who use the e-hailing service provided by Company B.
While market shares represent the choice of passengers for using the e-hailing service from these two companies, the choice of drivers may not be exactly the same with or proportional to a company's market share. We define driver ratio as the proportion of drivers who work for a company and denote the driver ratios of two companies as β A and β B , where 0 ≤ β A ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ β B ≤ 1. As we have not taken doubleapping into consideration, we have β A + β B = 1 for now. If the total number of drivers is N , β A · N drivers work for Company A and β B · N drivers work for Company B.
The common business model of these ridesharing companies is to split revenue with the drivers, however, this revenue split ratio or commission charge ratio exists as a business secret and may vary from city to city, with no public source of updating this ratio timely. Thus the revenue split ratio is not considered in this paper and we would evaluate the drivers' revenue before commission charges. Another reason for ignoring this step is that the commission charges of different ridesharing companies usually stay on the same level, because an obvious disadvantage of using a higher charge ratio is to incentivize drivers to work for competitors.
B. RIDE REQUEST
For simplicity, we use a X × Y grid map instead of a real city map with road network. Each grid is labeled with a twoelement id (x, y), where 1 ≤ x ≤ X and 1 ≤ y ≤ Y . A ride request is modeled as a tuple which consists of company tag, ride request id, start grid id, start timestamp, end grid id, trip duration, and trip fare. The trip duration is extracted from GPS trajectories in our work and can be estimated in practice using any state-of-the-art navigation service, e.g., Google Maps. We use the company tag to denote the recipient of the ride request. To protect the privacy of passengers, we do not use a passenger id. Instead, we use a ride request id for distinction.
C. DRIVER MODEL
Similar to the ride request, a driver is also modeled as a tuple which consists of company tag, driver id, current grid id, status. The company tag is used to denote the company that the driver works for and the current grid id is used to record the location of the driver. Whenever an idle driver is assigned a trip request, the driver would pick up and deliver the passenger. Until the trip is accomplished, the driver stays occupied and the occupied drivers would not be considered for serving new trip requests. Otherwise, an idle driver would keep idle. The state transition process is illustrated in Figure 1 . In this work, we would not consider the option of carpooling service, i.e., Uber Pool or Lyft Line. And for simplicity, we assume that the drivers stand by 24 hours in our simulations. 
D. DISPATCH STRATEGY
When the ridesharing company gets a ride request, it must designate a nearby driver to fulfill the delivery job of this ride request. While the dispatch strategy may be complex in reality, we adopt a simple nearest-idle-driver strategy that is widely used in taxi dispatching [30] . The nearest-idledriver dispatch strategy is formally stated in Algorithm 1. The function Manhattan_Distance calculates the Manhattan distance [31] between two grids. Specifically, the Manhattan distance between grid id (x 1 , y 1 ) and grid id (x 2 , y 2 ) is |x 1 −x 2 |+|y 1 −y 2 |. To avoid unreasonably long-distance pickups, we add the constraint of a maximum dispatch distance. We denote this maximum dispatch distance threshold as δ, and if there is no idle drivers within this threshold, the trip request gets unassigned.
E. CRUISING MODES
In practice, idle drivers would cruise around and seek for a higher opportunity of being assigned, as the ride request is for d ∈ all idle drivers ⊂ D do 4: if Manhattan_Distance(d.current_grid_id, r.start_grid_id) == i then 5: put driver d into S 6: end if 7: end for 8: if S is not empty then 9: Randomly select a driver as d selected from S 10:
end if 12: i ← i + 1 13: end while 14: return the selected driver d selected unevenly distributed on the map. In this work, we would consider four cruising modes, i.e., stationary, random, gravity, and historical, and the first three modes are inspired by [32] .
Mathematically, we assume the cruising process satisfies the Markov property and thus is a Markov chain. The cruising mode describes one-step transition probability, which is the probability of transition from one grid to another grid in our work. Specifically, suppose a driver is in grid (x i , y i ) at time t i , and after a predefined time step t, the driver moves to grid (x i+1 , y i+1 ) at time t i+1 , where (
In this work, we restrict the legal movement of idle drivers to neighbor grids. And in cases of the map's corners and borders, the driver is bounded within the map and cannot go out of the map's scope. Now we can state the four cruising modes in both text and mathematical formulation.
1) STATIONARY MODE
The drivers do not move unless they are assigned a trip.
2) RANDOM MODE
The drivers stay in the same grid or go for any legal neighbor grid on the map randomly with the same probability. Pr{(x i+1 , y i+1 )|(x i , y i )} = 1/S, where S represents the number of elements in the legal movement set. We have S = 3, when (x i , y i ) is in the corner of the map, S = 4, when (x i , y i ) is on the border of the map, and S = 5, otherwise.
3) GRAVITY MODE
The drivers navigate back toward the ''demand gravity'', where the demand density is the greatest. In this mode, we assume that the drivers know where the city hot spots are.
, y i+1 )}, where ride request appearance probability Pr riderequest {(x i+1 , y i+1 )} is the probability that a ride request's start grid id is (x i+1 , y i+1 ). The one-step transition probability is proportional to this ride request appearance probability and normalized afterwards.
4) HISTORICAL MODE
The drivers move with the historical statistical patterns.
where Pr history is the historical transition probability we learn from drivers' movement history.
F. EVALUATION METRICS
To evaluate the effects of double-apping, we propose to use the following four evaluation metrics, i.e., assigned ratio, dispatch distance, order number, and driver's profit.
1) ASSIGNED RATIO
As we mentioned in Section III-D, there is a chance that a ride request gets unassigned. We define assigned ratio as the ratio of ride requests that get assigned and served by a driver. Intuitively, a company would prefer a higher assigned ratio for its ride requests as it brings more value for the company.
2) DISPATCH DISTANCE
For the assigned ride requests, we define dispatch distance as the Manhattan distance between the driver's current grid and the ride request's start grid, which we regard as the passenger's current grid. A passenger would prefer a lower dispatch distance, which usually means a less pick-up time under the same traffic condition.
3) ORDER NUMBER
We define order number as the number of ride requests served by a driver within a simulation time period, which is usually a day. And in this work, we would use the average order number for the drivers who work for the same company. A driver would prefer a larger order number as it brings a higher revenue for the driver.
4) DRIVER's PROFIT
A driver's revenue comes from the trip fare, and there is some inevitable cost when driving on the road, e.g., gasoline consumption. We define driver's profit as gross profit, which equals revenue minus cost.
G. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Before defining the behaviors of double-apping, we give one final definition of market equilibrium based on the concept of driver's profit. As we mentioned in Section III-A, driver ratio may not necessarily be the same with market share. Given a specific market share, there exists a market equilibrium with VOLUME 6, 2018 a stable driver ratio, when working for either company would bring the same profit for a new driver. The market equilibrium may be different with different cruising modes, as the cruising mode would affect the chance of getting assigned and the cruising cost, and further affect the profit.
H. PASSENGER's DOUBLE-APPING
While in the baseline situation without double-apping, the ride request from a passenger is handled by only one company. However, in reality, if there is no drivers available from this particular company, a passenger may open another application and try the other company's e-hailing service. We coin this phenomenon as passenger's double-apping. In this work, we assume that there is still a priority for the first company, as the passengers would only practice double-apping when they could not be served by the original company. This priority would cause a minor inequality between two companies and distinguish the influence between passenger's doubleapping and driver's double-apping, as we would see later.
I. DRIVER's DOUBLE-APPING
As we mentioned in Section I, the drivers are not officially employed, they can work for both ridesharing companies without violating any regulation. We coin this phenomenon as driver's double-apping. Different from passenger's doubleapping, we assume that there is no priority from the viewpoint of drivers and they would serve any ride request that comes first, if they practice double-apping in this work.
We also assume that a ridesharing company does not know whether its drivers are working for a component or not in reality. So a driver who works for this company and a driver who works for both companies have the same chance of being assigned when a ride request comes, as long as he/she is idle and within the dispatch range of the ride request's start location.
IV. SIMULATION
In this section, we describe the details of our simulations.
A. DATA DESCRIPTION
In this work, we extract the taxi trips from GPS trajectories and use them as ride requests. In this part, we give the basic description of the taxi GPS trajectories, and Beijing map range used in our work.
1) TAXI TRAJECTORIES
We use a GPS trajectory dataset collected in Beijing on 5 weekdays from November 2 to November 6, 2015. Since human traveling patterns are notably different in weekdays and weekends/holidays, we only consider weekdays in this work. The dataset is generated by 20,067 taxi drivers and is sampled at a rate of one minute, as required by China's government. Each sample contains the anonymous taxi identity, timestamp, latitude, longitude, azimuth, spot speed, and operation status (occupied, vacant, or stopped). These information would be used to extract taxi trips, as we would discuss later in Section IV-B. We also build a GPS_to_Grid function to transform a GPS coordinate, which is located in our map range, to the corresponding grid id. Specifically, given an input as a GPS coordinate (LON, LAT), the function generates an output as a grid id (x, y). The transforming formula is shown as follows:
where MIN_LON = 116.2495940924, MAX_LON = 116.4960730076, MIN_LAT = 39.8228834055, and MAX_LAT = 39.9977119404, as we specify as the map range. Function int(·) ensures that the grid id contains only integers.
B. PREPROCESSING
In this part, we introduce the process of extracting ride requests from raw GPS trajectories.
1) MEDIAN FILTER
Since the trajectories are normally measured by a sensor, they inevitably have some error, including occasional outliers.
In this work, we use a simple but effective median filter [33] to remove the outliers. For a measured point p i , the estimate of the (unknown) true value is the median of p i and its n − 1 predecessors in time:
In this work, we choose n = 5 empirically, and a sample result of applying a median filter is shown in Figure 3 . The underlying line without markers represents the original GPS trajectory and the above line with asterisk markers represents the filtered result. While the median filter has effectively removed the outliers, it also causes some loss of the true values. We leave the study of applying more sophisticated filters, like the Kalman filter [34] and the particle filter [35] , into future consideration. 
2) TRIP EXTRACTION
Based on the filtered GPS trajectories, our objective is to extract the trip information from the data in a similar way to [36] . We extract both passenger-delivery trips and passenger-searching trips from the GPS trajectories. A passenger-delivery trip starts when a taxi picks up a passenger and becomes occupied from a previous vacant status, and ends when the taxi drops off the passenger and becomes vacant again. A passenger-searching trip is basically the opposite process. We use the passenger-delivery trips to simulate the ride requests and estimate the transition probability in the gravity cruising mode, and the passenger-searching trips to estimate the historical transition probability in the historical cruising mode.
Specifically, a taxi trip (passenger-delivery or passengersearching) consists of a string of GPS points, which is { lon 1 , lat 1 , t 1 , lon 2 , lat 2 , t 2 , . . . , lon P , lat P , t P }, where lon i , lat i represent geographic coordinates (longitudes and latitudes) at time t i , and P is the total number of GPS points in this particular trip. The start and end GPS points are identified by the status change, as we described above. The duration of the trip is thus t P − t 1 .
However, the dataset is imperfect, as the information about whether the taxi is occupied or vacant may be incorrect.
To alleviate this problem, we define that a trip is valid only if the trip lasts for at least 1 minute, i.e., t P − t 1 > 1 minute. This specification filters out the case when a vacant taxi is labeled as occupied mistakenly, and we only consider valid trips in this work.
For a passenger-delivery trip, we use the same formulation shown in Equation (1) - (2) to transform the GPS point to the grid id, i.e., (lon 1 , lat 1 ) → start grid id, and (lon N , lat N ) → end grid id. We use t 1 as the start timestamp, and the duration of the trip as the trip duration of the ride request. We would discuss the fare estimation process in Section IV-B3. We show the number of ride requests we extract and use in our simulations in Table 1 . The ride requests are also publicly available for other research. 1 
3) FARE ESTIMATION
For a trip trajectory represented as the string of GPS points, we estimate the trip distance as the summation of the road segments in the trajectory, i.e.,
Haversine_Distance((lon i , lat i ), (lon i+1 , lat i+1 )), where function Haversine_Distance uses the well known Haversine formula [37] , which gives the shortest distance between two locations along the surface of the Earth.
Since the original GPS dataset does not contain the fare information, we estimate the fare based on the latest Beijing taxi pricing rule released in 2016 (Table 2) , and use it as the trip fare charged from both ridesharing companies in our simulations.
4) COST ESTIMATION
We consider the gasoline consumption as the main cost of drivers. The gasoline consumption rate is estimated as 6.9L/100km, based on China's Phase IV fuel consumption standard for passenger vehicles, and the gasoline price was about 5.92 RMB/L in December 2016, which is used in this work.
Gasoline consumption occurs both in delivering passengers and in cruising process. We use the trip distance described in Section IV-B3 to calculate the driving distance occurred in delivering passengers. We use the Manhattan distance described in Section III-D to calculate the number of grids traveled when drivers move from one grid to another grid, and multiply this grid number by the unit length of 200 meters to approximate the driving distance. Here we assume that when the driver stays stationary in the same grid, there is no movement and thus no gasoline consumption. 
5) CRUISING PROBABILITY ESTIMATION
Based on the ride requests we extract in Section IV-B2, we can estimate Pr riderequest {(x i , y i )} used in Section III-E3. Here, we use all the ride requests from November 2 to November 6 to estimate the ride request appearance probability Pr riderequest {(x i , y i )} as follows:
Number of ride requests that start from (x i , y i )
Total number of ride requests
Based on the passenger-searching trips we extract in Section IV-B2, we can estimate historical transition probability Pr history {(x i+1 , y i+1 )|(x i , y i )} used in Section III-E4 as follows: Occurrence number of moving from (x i , y i ) to (x i+1 , y i+1 ) Total occurrence number of moving from (x i , y i )
C. PARAMETERS
Based on the dataset we use, we specify the value or the range of the parameters that we described in Section III and used in Section IV-D. We summarize these parameters in Table 3 . In our simulations, some parameters are fixed for now and we would leave the influence of these parameters to future research. 
D. SIMULATION PROCESS 1) BASELINE SITUATION
In our simulations, we examine the baseline situation without double-apping at first. By changing driver ratios, we can find the market equilibria defined in Section III-G under different market shares. We also evaluate the simulations using the evaluation metrics we defined in Section III-F, when the drivers are using different cruising modes defined in Section III-E. We take one day as a simulation round and the ride requests would be generated in the same chronological order as specified by the start timestamp. For each round, we run the simulations for five times and take the average result. And in each simulation, the drivers are initialized as idle with a random position. The final result is averaged among the five days we use in this work, which means each result is a mean value from 5 × 5 runs. We do the same for the double-apping situation as we are about to describe later in Section IV-D2.
2) DOUBLE-APPING SITUATION
For simplicity, we only consider the situations of both passenger's double-apping and driver's double-apping when the market is at equilibrium in the baseline situation. In other words, when the driver ratio becomes stable for both companies, we add the effects of either passenger's doubleapping or driver's double-apping, or both, and see how double-apping would affect the market.
Specifically, we would consider both one-sided doubleapping and two-sided double-apping when passenger's double-apping or driver's double-apping exists. For onesided double-apping, we mean that the passengers or the drivers from only one company would practice doubleapping. By symmetry, we can only consider the one-sided double-apping of Company A. For two-sided double-apping, we mean that the passengers or the drivers from both companies would practice double-apping.
To summarize, we would consider five scenarios as follows:
• Baseline: when there is no double-apping;
• One-sided passenger: when the passengers from Company A would practice double-apping;
• Two-sided passenger: when the passengers from both Company A and Company B would practice double-apping; • One-sided driver: when the drivers from Company A would practice double-apping;
• Two-sided driver: when the drivers from both Company A and Company B would practice double-apping.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we would present our simulation results as well as our analysis.
A. BASELINE SITUATION
To find the market equilibria under different market shares, we fix the market share to 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9 and change the driver ratio from 0.05 to 0.95 with a step size 0.05. Then with each driver ratio we've chosen, we can compare the assigned ratio of the ride requests, the average dispatch distance of the assigned ride requests, the average order number of a driver, and the average driver's profit, when the drivers adopt different cruising modes. Then we use the profit results of the drivers from both companies to calculate the crossing point and the corresponding driver ratio, which is exactly the market equilibrium. The market equilibria with different market shares and cruising modes are shown in Figure 4 . Basically, the driver ratio of Company A at equilibrium grows with a higher market share, but the relationship is not necessarily linear. When the market share of Company A is larger than 0.5, the driver ratio of Company A at equilibrium is generally larger than the corresponding market share, which is similar to the network effect when the value of the e-hailing service increases according to the number of others using it. And the cruising mode also affects the market equilibrium. As we can learn from Figure 4 , with the random cruising mode, more drivers would work for Company A at equilibrium compared to other modes, under the same market share.
We give the specific results when the market share of Company A is 0.5, which is actually a symmetric case as we can easily tell from Figure 5 . When the market share is fixed, the higher the driver ratio of Company A is, the better the results of Company A are. Here, a better result means either a higher assigned ratio, or a lower dispatch distance, or a larger order number, or a higher profit. We can also find that the two cruising modes, gravity and historical, generate better results than the remaining two modes in most cases. From Figure 5 (a), we confirm that the market equilibrium is half-and-half, which satisfies our intuition as the situation is symmetric. And at equilibrium, the historical cruising mode gives the best results in terms of assigned ratio, order number, and profit, while the gravity cruising mode outperforms the other three modes on dispatch distance.
Compared with the concise and clear results as we discussed above, the results are more messy when the market share of Company A is 0.8, which is shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7 , because the symmetry property does not hold now. The results are more complex, but generally the gravity and historical cruising modes perform better in most cases of different driver ratios. And the market equilibrium changes with different cruising modes, as shown in Figure 7(b) .
B. DOUBLE-APPING SITUATION
We study the effects of double-apping as we described in Section IV-D2 and use the four evaluation metrics to see how double-apping changes the baseline situation which is originally at equilibrium. As we can tell from Figure 4 , the market is extremely unbalanced when the market share of Company A is greater than 0.7 or less than 0.3, which leaves little space for us to study the effects of double-apping, as the company with the large market share would already have We show the assigned ratios when double-apping happens in Figure 8 . For a clear comparison between different cruising modes, we use the same y axis range in the four subfigures of Figure 8 . We follow the same rule, when we show the effects of double-apping on dispatch distance in Figure 9 , the effects on order number in Figure 10 and Figure 11 , and the effects on driver's profit in Figure 12 .
Compared with the baseline case, the assigned ratio of Company A drops when only the drivers who originally work solely for Company A now practice double-apping. This result is reasonable as these drivers would be diverted from serving the ride requests sent by the passengers of Company B. By contrast, the assigned ratio of Company B drops when only the passengers who originally use Company A's e-hailing service now also use Company B's e-hailing service. These passengers would share the time resource of Company B's drivers and cause a loss to the loyal passengers of Company B.
This observation inspires a conjecture that the effects of passenger's double-apping and driver's double-apping are opposite to each other. Driver's double-apping behavior brings loss to the original employer, but brings benefit to the competitor. Passenger's double-apping has the opposite effect. While this opposite effect may not be as exact as it seems, because there is a priority for the original company during the practice of passenger's double-apping, as we discussed in Section III-H. To see the distinction, the benefit of driver's one-sided double-apping to Company A's drivers (the orange solid line with triangle_up markers) is larger than the benefit of passenger's one-sided double-apping to Company B's drivers (the red dashed line with square markers) in Figure 10 to Figure 12 . This is because even though Company A's passengers are practicing double-apping, they would try to use Company A's e-hailing service at first as we assume, and bring less opportunities to Company B's drivers.
The second observation is that the assigned ratio remains stable with different market share in some cases. This result is understandable. When the passengers of Company A practices double-apping, the market share and driver ratio of Company A become less important as its passengers have access to all the drivers and the major constraint is the serving capacity of the drivers, which is irrelevant with the market share. The same argument holds when the drivers of both companies practice double-apping.
The third observation is that two-sided double-apping is mutually beneficially, regardless of whether it is driver's double-apping or passenger's double-apping. The inspiration is that as long as every passenger uses the e-hailing service from both companies, or every driver works for both companies, the market is efficient as all the potentials have been exploited. However, this wish is hardly achieved for multiple reasons. From the passenger's perspective, the cost of downloading a mobile application and registering an account hampers them from using the e-hailing service provided by another company. The same trouble bothers the drivers, too. Furthermore, the ridesharing companies would also prevent its own drivers from double-apping. As we discussed above, if only the drivers of Company A practice double-apping, the benefit of the passengers of Company A is actually harmed, which is not the result that Company A would expect and accept. The mutual benefit can only be achieved by two-sided doubleapping, which is hardly achievable without a contract, as in reality the ridesharing company is selfish and tends to be a free rider. This phenomenon is actually the famous Prisoner's Dilemma, which has been extensively discussed in the economic literature. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to identify this connection between the attitude of a ridesharing company to double-apping with the famous Prisoner's Dilemma. One problem with the two-sided double-apping is that the e-hailing service would become homogeneous among different ridesharing companies, and it becomes meaningless to discuss about choosing companies. This helps to explain why Uber would be unhappy with the phenomenon that some of its drivers are working simulatenously for Lyft, as we discussed in Section I, because it has no guarantee that Lyft's drivers would also serve its own passengers, and Uber definitely does not want to lose its users to other competitors since it wants to keep the position as the leader in the ride-hailing market.
Comparison between different cruising modes here gives us the similar conclusion that the gravity and historical modes perform better in most cases, as we've already found in Section V-A. Similar results are also observed in Figure 10 - Figure 12 and we would simply present the figures, without repeating the discussion. Now we are ready to give the short answers to the three questions we proposed in Section I.
• Why would passengers practice double-apping? Because passenger's double-apping brings a higher successful probability of getting a ride and a smaller dispatch distance, as shown in Figure 8 to Figure 9 .
• Why would drivers be willing to drive for multiple ridesharing companies? Because driver's double-apping brings more orders and a higher profit, as shown in Figure 10 to Figure 12 .
• Would it always be a bad thing for a company if its drivers work for another ridesharing company simultaneously? This question is more complex than the former two questions. And we propose to use the analogy of Prisoner's Dilemma to answer this question. Without an effective and guaranteed cooperation, a unilateral action of allowing driver's double-apping may harm the interests of the ridesharing company and even make its competitors become free riders.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we give the first systematic study of the effects of double-apping, a common practice that has been found in the smartphone-based e-hailing market. Our work makes up for the lack of study about this phenomenon in the existing literature. Our simulations exhibit an effective way of quantifying the effects of double-apping and validate the motivations of passengers and drivers. Furthermore, the connection between double-apping and the network effect and Prisoner's Dilemma opens up new avenues for further research.
